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NOTES
AMERICAN MERCENARIES AND THE
NEUTRALITY ACT: SHORTENING THE LEASH
ON THE DOGS OF WAR
INTRODUCTION
Mercenaries' have participated in armed conflicts for over 3000 years.2 Kings
and despots utilized mercenaries to acquire and maintain power and wealth.' Recent events in Africa 4 and Central America 5 indicate that a strong market for
mercenaries still exists today and that mercenaries remain a real threat to national
sovereignty and world peace. Third World representatives have expressed alarm
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

A mercenary has been defined as a person who:
a) is especially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in
fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the Conflict, material compensation substantially
in excess of that promised or paid combatants of similar rank and function in the armed forces
of that Party;
d) is neither a national of a Party to the Conflict nor a resident of a territory controlled by a
Party to the Conflict;
e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the Conflict; and
f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the Conflict on official duty as a
member of its armed forces.
Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International HumanitarianLaw Applicable in Armed Conflicts, June 10, 1977, reprinted in D. SCHINDLER & J. ToMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS 579 (1981).
The author finds this definition inadequate, however, because it excludes those individuals engaging in paramilitary activities for ideological rather than pecuniary reasons. A proper definition of
mercenaries must not, as a matter of logic, differentiate between "freedom fighters" (such as Cubans in
Angola), religious fanatics in the Middle East, or American citizens fighting in Central America.
W. BURCHETr & D. ROEBUCK, THE WHORES OF WAR: MERCENARIES TODAY 7 (1977).
For a history of mercenaries, see V. G. KIERNAN, FOREIGN MERCENARIES AND ABSOLUTE MONARCHY, PAST AND PRESENT 66-86 (1957); M. MALLETr, MERCENARIES AND THEIR MASTERS:
WARFARE IN RENAISSANCE ITALY (1974); R. SMITH, MERCENARIES AND MANDARINS: THE EVERVICTORIOUS ARMY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY CHINA (1978); A. MOCKLER, THE MERCENARIES
(1964).
Until the French Revolution, most European monarchs considered it an accepted practice to conduct warfare with an army comprised predominantly of mercenaries. The death of feudalism and the
emergence of the nation-state made mercenary armies obsolete. A. MOCKLER, supra at 14-15.
For example, Hannibal's army, which invaded and sacked Rome, was composed entirely of mercenaries. England built her empire with soldiers rented from Frederick the Great. Id. at 17-18. Great
Britain's King George III utilized Hessian mercenaries to fight against American revolutionaries.
Most recently, many of the white regimes in colonial Africa used mercenaries to fight against black
insurgents during the African wars of liberation. W. BURCHETT and D. ROEBUCK, supra note 2, at 89.
Cesner and Brant, The Law of the Mercenary: An InternationalDilemma, 6 CAP. U. L. REv. 340
(1977). In June of 1976, Angola convicted 14 mercenaries and executed five, including one American,
for participating in paramilitary activities against that nation. Id. at 340. See also 19 U.N. MONTHLY
CHRON. Feb. 1982, at 64. In November, 1981, South African, Rhodesian and European mercenaries
attacked Seychelles in an attempt to overthrow that nation's leftist government. Seychelles' army
repulsed the attack. Most of the mercenaries returned to South Africa, which refused to extradite
them for trial. Id. at 64-65.
42 CONG. Q. 2230 (1984). On September 1, 1984, Nicaraguan troops shot down a helicopter, killing
two Americans from Alabama fighting with the Contradoras. See also US. Policy towards Nicaragua,
CONG. DIG. Nov. 1984, at 265.
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over the growing use of mercenaries by "imperialistic" nations in covert operations.' The United Nations responded to this threat by adopting a resolution urging all member nations to "consider effective measures to prohibit the
recruitment,
training, assembly, transit and use of mercenaries within their
7
border.",

In the three years since the United Nations adopted this resolution, the United
States has yet to enact legislation concerning the recruitment of mercenaries
within the United States. The recent deaths of two American mercenaries in Nicaragua' has spurred interest in formulating laws to restrict the involvement of
private citizens in foreign conflicts.9 The Reagan administration, however, has
stated that it will not discourage private citizens from participating in foreign civil
wars' 0 since United States law' does not prohibit private military expeditions
begun on foreign soil.' 2
3
While the Reagan administration's legal interpretation is technically correct,1
it ignores the impact American mercenaries have on national security and foreign
relations. The Government's complicity in both the training of foreign mercenaries on American soil and the presence of American mercenaries abroad serves
only to increase an already tense world situation. " The administration's interpretation is also in conflict with the United Nations position on mercenaries. The
6.

Note, Leashing the Dogs of War: Outlawing the Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries, 22 VA. J. INT'L
L. 589, n. 4 (1982). During recent United Nations debates on mercenaries, representatives of the
Third World emphasized the threat that mercenaries pose to their nations. See Summary Record of
the 17th Meeting, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/36/SR.17 (1981).
7.
Note, supra note 6, at 590. The U.N. stated that mercenary acts represent a threat to the "selfdetermination of all peoples struggling against colonialism, racism, and apartheid and all forms of
foreign domination." G.A. Res. 35/48, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 8) at 257-58, U.N. Doc. A/35/48
(1981). See also 18 U.N. MON. CHRON. Feb. 1981, at 64 (regarding establishment of an ad hoc committee to draft a convention on mercenaries). The U.N. has increasingly emphasized the threat
presented by mercenaries fighting on behalf of repressive regimes in wars of national liberation. See
Drafting of an InternationalConvention Against Activities of Mercenaries,G.A. Res. 34/104, 34 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 42, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980).
Communist and Third World Nations promoted the recognition of a distinction between volunteers fighting on behalf of "legitimate" liberation efforts and mercenaries hired to defend reactionary
regimes. They were unable, however, to develop a workable criteria by which to make a distinction.
See Summary Record of 20th Meeting at 4, U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/36/SR.20 (1981).
8.
See CONG. Q. supra note 5, at 2230.
9.
See, e.g., H.R. 6243, 98th Cong. 2nd Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H9526 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984). The bill,
introduced by Rep. G. V. Montgomery (D-Miss.), would prohibit any member of the U.S. military
reserves or National Guard from participating in any foreign conflict without the express permission
of the President or Secretary of State. Montgomery opposes the involvement of these groups on the
grounds that it erodes U.S. military readiness. CONG. Q., supra note 5, at 2230. Other congressmen
have expressed the fear that "free-lance" military activity by private citizens will misrepresent United
States official foreign policy towards a particular nation or conflict. Id. That members of the military
reserves were acting as private citizens could be overshadowed by the implication that their membership in the U.S. Reserves "connotes U.S. government complicity." Id. at 2445.
10. CONG. Q., supra note 5, at 2230. See also Friedlander, Mr. Casey's "Covert" War: The United States,
Nicaragua and InternationalLaw, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 265 (1985). The Reagan administration
initially denied any official involvement, but acknowledged that U.S. embassy personnel throughout
Central America were in contact with the mercenaries. Id.
11. Neutrality Act, 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1982). Infra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
12. CONG. Q., supra note 5, at 2230.
13. The Reagan administration is not the first to adopt this interpretation of the Neutrality Act. The
Kennedy, Ford and Carter administrations also utilized similar excuses to ignore the mercenary activities of U.S. citizens abroad. In 1961, Attorney General Robert Kennedy justified nonenforcement of
the neutrality laws on the grounds that the invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, although organized in
the United States, was launched from C.I.A. bases in Guatemala.
14. Sigmund, Latin America: Change or Continuity, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 629, 639 (1982). Nicaragua justified expanding its army to 50,000 soldiers with a 200,000 man militia, receiving $28 million in military
aid from Cuba and the Soviet Union, and allowing 1,500 Cuban advisors into the country in part
because the United States has failed to enforce its neutrality laws. The Nicaraguans have also asserted
that the presence of American mercenaries in Central America and U.S. support of rebels are a pro-
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United Nations has reduced the mercenary to an outlaw. 15 By refusing to enforce
current laws or enact new laws which limit mercenary activity, the United States
violates its moral and international legal obligation to respect the sovereignty of
other nations. 16 The mercenary activities of private citizens is incongruous with
the purpose 1 7 and formulation of American foreign policy. 8
This note will examine international law concerning mercenaries and state responsibility for citizen actions. It then argues that the United States has a duty
under international law to restrict the mercenary activities of its citizens, both
within and without its borders, to activities expressly authorized by the President
or Secretary of State. It also assesses the threat to foreign policy and national
security posed by American mercenaries. Finally, the note will review the status
of American mercenaries under the current law and proposes legislation which
will restrict mercenary activity while complying with the constitutional right to
travel.
MERCENARIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Under traditional international law the state and the individual operated in

different spheres. International law did not impute the purely private acts of a
citizen to the state. Instead, traditional international law did not expect states to
regulate the actions of its citizen beyond its borders.' 9 The nineteenth century
laissez-faire position of no state control beyond its borders fails given the princi-

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

logue to an United States invasion. See Nicaragua'sCompliant of Aggression Discussed by Security
Council, 21 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON. Mar. 1984, at 7.
We again face very dangerous events, clearly aimed at bringing about a war of destruction in
the Central American region. These [rebel] attacks on Nicaragua, U.S. monetary and military
support for the rebel forces, and the presence of Americans fighting with the [rebels] could be
the precursors of a war between Honduras and Nicaragua, provoked by the United States to
justify intervention.
Id. at 7.
"[T]he practice of using mercenaries against movements for national liberation and independence is
punishable as a criminal act and the mercenaries themselves are outlaws." U.N. Resolution No. 2548
(XXIV) (December 11, 1969). See also G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER
234-36 (1971).
M. GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HOSTILE ACTS OF PRIVATE PERSONS
AGAINST FOREIGN STATES 5 (1962) "Within its territory [each government has] the obligation to
prevent the commission of injurious actions against other states." Id. at 5. See also C. FENWICK,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 301 (4th ed. 1965) "Intervention, 'directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the international or external affairs of any other state is forbidden." Id. at 301 (quoting
U.N. CHARTER art. 15.)
C. FENWICK, FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1968). "Foreign policy may be defined. . . as the attitude the United States takes in its relations to and with other countries which, it is
believed best assures our national safety; how to protect our political, economic and social interest
...
1" Id. These goals are best served when the tools of foreign policy are restricted to a small,
responsive group within society. This allows policy to be executed in a consistent manner. Id.
U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cls. 10 and 11; See. 8 states: "The Congress shall have power.
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the
Law of Nations.
To declare War, grant Letters of Margue and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on
Land and Water."
Art. II, 2, cl. 2, states:
"The President ...
shall have the Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, . . . and he shall nominate . . . Ambassadors ..
"
The Constitution grants exclusive control of foreign policy to the Federal Government, particularly the executive branch. Allowing private citizens to engage in hostile acts against other sovereigns
with whom the United States is at peace interferes with the implementation of foreign policy and the
protection of national security by those bodies designated by the Constitution.
See M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 16, at 6-8. This attitude reflected a laissez-faire perception of
international law. A state had no right or duty to restrict the freedom of its citizens to engage in
voluntary activites against another nation. This coincided with the traditional international law per-
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pies of twentieth century global interdependence articulated in the United Nations
charter.2"
Mercenaries and International Law
Traditional customary international law2 1 did not hold a nation vicariously
liable for the acts of its citizens.2 2 International law only held a nation liable for
the acts of private persons when the nation acquiesced in the performance of those
acts or failed to exercise due diligence in preventing them. 3 A neutral nation
ception of the sovereign enjoying absolute rights within its boundaries, but only within its boundaries.
Id. at 6.
The failure of traditional international law to obligate neutral states to restrict their citizens' mercenary activities ignores the actual harm they cause. In analyzing international law, Professor John B.
Moore states:
No act . . . could be more clearly unneutral than that of a citizen of a neutral country
going abroad and enlisting in the military or naval service of a belligerent; and yet this is an act
which a neutral government is not obliged to prevent, and neutral governments do not in fact
undertake to prevent it.
C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES

20.

21.

2306 (2d rev. ed. 1945).
U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
The purpose of the United Nations is "to maintain international peace and security... [through]
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace ....
" Id.
The Charter requires nations to take necessary steps to alleviate threats to world peace. Id. at art.
2, 14. See also M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 15, at 97; A. CASSESE, THE NEW HUMANITARIAN
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 120-21 (1979).
M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 25-34 (4th ed. 1982).

Cus-

tomary international law is one of the sources utilized by the International Court of Justice to decide
disputes. Id. at 23, See also STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 5, § 1, cl. b.,
reprinted in S. ROSENNE, DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICES 79 (1979).

Customary law arises primarily from the content of states' public pronouncements by government
officials, respected threatises or court opinions. Akehurst, supra at 25-26.

Some question exists concerning the role of customary international law in relation to American
domestic law. In The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), the Supreme Court stated:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts
of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and

usages of civilized nations ....
175 U.S. at 700.
Cases following The Paquete Habana have split on whether customary international law is a part

of domestic law. Holding for inclusion, See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980);
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Ks. 1980), afl'd Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). Even before The Paquet Habana the Supreme Court had incor-

porated the law of nations into domestic law. See The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815);
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 198 (1796); Republica v. DeLongchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 113, 119
(1784).
In contrast, the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed dismissal on the grounds that international
law did not give the court jurisdicton. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (per curium) (Bork, J., concurring); United States v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 972 (1967).
Commentators have also disagreed on what, if any, weight courts should give customary international law. Henkin, InternationalLaw in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (1984).
That international law is part of the law of the United States is asserted and accepted today
as it was at our national beginnings. . . [lit seems right too that the courts should continue to
give effect to developments in international law to which the United States is a party, unless
Congress is moved to reject them as domestic law ...
Id. at 1569. See also Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Partof the NationalLaw of the United States,
101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 27 (1952). Contra Goldklang, Back on Board The Paquete Habana; Resolving
the Conflict Between States and Customary InternationalLaw, 25 VA. J. INT'L. L. 144 (1984).
22. Burmester, The Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries in Armed Conflict, 72 AM. J. INT'L. L. 37, 42
(1978); See also M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 16, at 81.
23. C. FENWICK, supra note 17, at 390. A state's responsibility could arise either through a direct act
against a foreign state or by offenses against foreign aliens residing, permanently or temporarily, in the
nation of the offenders. States have the responsibility to extend to aliens the same protection offered its
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only has a duty to remain impartial. Impartiality meant a neutral state would not
allow the formation of armed bands or the operation of recruiting stations within
its territory.24 The nation had no duty to restrict volunteers from offering their
services to foreign belligerents.2 5 Instead, traditional international law associated
volunteers with the belligerents they joined.2 6 This laissez-faire construction of
international law was codified in 1907,27 and remained the controlling law until

after World War 11.28
Although the United Nations has not specifically banned the use of mercenaries, it has, through various conventions and resolutions, 29 lowered their status
to that of a common criminal.30 The United Nations equates mercenary acts with
a violation of state sovereignty.31 Mercenary acts breach the founding principles
of the United Nations of international peace, security and protection of the territorial integrity of independent states.12 In 1969, the U.N. General Assembly
own citizens. Id. at 391. See J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 294 (9th ed.

24.

25.
26.
27.

1984). Traditional international law did hold nations vicariously responsible for the private acts of its
officers or agents. The "imputability" of an act depended on two circumstances: "conduct of a state's
. . . official in breach of an obligation defined in a rule of international law; [and] that according to
international law, the breach will be attributed to the state." Id. at 294.
Garcia-Mora, International Law and the Control of Revolutionary Activities by Political Refugees
Under American Law, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 195, 196 (1961). As Judge Huber stated in Island of
Palmas (U.S. v. Ned.) 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 831 (1928):
Territorial sovereignty. . . involves the exclusive right to display the activities of the State.
This right has a corollary duty: the obligation to protect within [its] territory the rights of
other states, in particular their right of integrity and inviolability in peace and war, together
with the right each may claim for its nationals in foreign territory.
Id. at 839.
Burmester, supra note 22, at 42.
Myers, ContemporaryPracticeof the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 54 AM. J. INT'L L.
632, 656 (1960).
Hague Convention (V) of 1907, Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in
Case of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2310, TS No. 540 (1908), reprinted in LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT

supra note 1, at 847. Article 5 provides: "A neutral power... is not called upon to punish acts in
violation of its neutrality unless the said acts have been committed on its own territory." Id. at 849.
See also A. CASSESE, supra note 20, at 118-19.
28.

M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 16, at 68-69.

29.

Regarding the legal significance of U.N. Resolutions and Conventions, see J. CASTENEDA, LEGAL
EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS (1969) ("[U.N. Resolutions] dealing with the external

activity of the organization do not legally require their recipients to comply with their content, that is,
they are recommendations") Id. at 71, and 0. ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
DECLARTIONS OF THE GENRERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1966) ("[R]esolutions of
. in appropriate circumstances constitute formal or

the Assembly, apart from creating precedence. .
material sources of international law") Id. at 46.
30.

31.

32.

Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention art. 47 § 1, reprintedin LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS

supra note 1, at 579. "A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner-of-war."
This denies a mercenary the rights afforded combatants under the Geneva Convention. See Resolution No. 2548 (XXIV) of December 11, 1969. The "practice of using mercenaries against movements
for national liberation and independence is punishable as a criminal act and the mercenaries themselves are considered outlaws." Id. The resolution in essence allows nations against whom the mercenary has fought to prosecute that individual under domestic laws.
Note, supra note 6, at 594. "[T]he sending of mercenaries, by or on the behalf of a state, in carry out
acts of armed force against another state, constitutes 'aggression' as contemplated by the [U.N.] Charter." Id., (quoting Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142-43,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975)).
U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, § 4, 59 Stat. 1031, 1037, TS No. 993, at 7 (1945). "All members shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." Id. at 2(4).
Mercenary activities have gained greater attention in the U.N. since the emergence of the nonalligned nations as a concerted voice. This probably reflects the reality that mercenaries are most
often used against these nations. Also, mercenaries most often originate from European or North
American nations. One basic tenet of mercenaries is, "white and west are wisest and best." W.
BURCHETr & D. ROEBUCK, supra note 2, at 116.
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adopted a resolution which made the use of mercenaries a crime.3 3 The resolution
encourages the passage of domestic sanctions against recruiting, financing and
training mercenaries within a state's jurisdiction. The resolution also encourages
states to pass domestic legislation prohibiting their nationals from participating in
paramilitary expeditions against foreign states. 34 Four years later, the General Assembly adopted a resolution endorsing the legal status of "freedom fighters", as
opposed to mercenaries. 35 In 1975, U.N. Resolution 3314 brought the use of mercenaries within the general definition of "aggression" 3 6 by stating that, with or
without a declaration of war, the sending of "armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed forces against another state" shall
constitute an act of aggression. 37
Finally, in 1977, Additional I Protocol to the Geneva Convention 38 further
altered the legal status of mercenaries. The Convention stripped mercenaries of
their legal status as participants in armed conflict. 39 Without this status mercenaries lack the protection afforded other combatants. By categorizing mercenaries as outlaws, the Protocol places them outside the accepted methods of
warfare and within the definition of hostile acts which international law prohibits.
Since amending the Geneva Convention of 1949,' the United Nations has
to expressly outlaw mercenaries. In 1980, the United Nations estabattempted
lished the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention
against the Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries." While the committee
has not yet produced a definitive convention outlawing mercenary activity, at least
one nation, relying on the United Nations proclamations, has prosecuted captured
33. See supra note 5.
34. See Resolution No. 2548 supra note 28. (The language of the resolution reflected the increased influence of Third World and Communist Bloc nations).
While not passed in response to the U.N. resolution, the United States presently has laws proscribing the recruitment, training and financing of mercenaries within its borders. 18 U.S.C. §§ 959-960
(1982). It has not, however, taken any steps to regulate the mercenary actions of Americans abroad.
35. Resolution No. 2548 (XXIV) of December 11, 1969, quoted in G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 15,
at 235. Resolution No. 3103 (XXVII) contained the identical distinction. A "freedom fighter" is a
"volunteer" assisting in the liberation of oppressed peoples. In contrast, a mercenary assists in the
propagation of repressive regimes. Obviously, one person's "freedom fighter" is another's mercenary,
depending on their ideological perspective.
36. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142-43, U.N. Doc. a/
9631(1975), reprinted in Note, supra note 6, at 594, n.32.
37. See D. SCHINELLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 1,at 579.
38. Supra note 30.
39. D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 1, at 577-79 (providing combatants, prisoners of war and
belligerents certain rights).
40. Convention (I) For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces
in the Field, July 6, 1906, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 5.
41. 18 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON. Feb. 1981, at 64, Resolution No. 35/48 Dec. 4, 1980. The Committee has
met for the past three years but has yet to present a final draft for adoption. The committee has
concentrated on: defining mercenaries; penalties for the offense; implementing the provisions of the
convention by appropriate administration and legislative measures; status of mercenaries; establishment of jurisdiction...; concurrent jurisdiciton by which a state having jurisdiciton might invoke the
convention's provisions against the offending State before any competent international organization or
tribunal; preventive measures against mercenary activities; mutual asistance among States; the taking
into custody of mercenaries; judicial guarantees; communication of the outcome of final proceedings;
extraditable offenses; and actions for damage/reparation. 19 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON. May 1982, at
37.
The committee has put forth draft articles imputing the actions of mercenaries to their nations of
origin and requiring that the state prosecute offenders. The draft would encourage states to pass
legislation necessary to inhibit mercenaries from leaving their territory. Id. at 36. The United States,
among others, has objected to preambular language which frames mercenary activities as a violation of
international law when the mercenaries "[impede] the self-determination of all peoples struggling
against colonialism, racism, and apartheid and all forms of foreign domination." 18 U.N. MONTHLY
CHRON. Feb. 1981 at 64. Given the numerical strength of the Third World and Communist bloc
nations on the committee, any final draft will likely reflect a bias against Western-backed forces.
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soldiers of fortune.4 2
The United Nations has outlawed both mercenary acts and interference with
the internal affairs of another country. Both violate basic principles of international law.4 3 The United States has endorsed the basic ideals of international
law" and has advocated the concept of an ordered international legal system as a
means of achieving these goals.45 The United States Constitution expressly provides that Congress will pass laws to "define and punish. . . offenses against the
law of nations." 4 6 Under international law, this must be done with due diligence.4 7 Therefore, the United States has a duty to enact laws designed to vitiate
any act, committed domestically or abroad, which breaches these principles of
international law.4 8 The United States owes this duty to all nations, whether or
not it executes treaties
of non-aggression or cooperation, since these are "obliga' 49
tions erga omnes.

In addition to its legal obligation, the United States also has a moral duty to
prevent the mercenary activities of Americans. As a sovereign, the United States
must respect the territorial integrity and political legitimacy of nations with whom
42.
43.
44.
45.

46.
47.
48.

49.

Cesner and Brant, supra note 4, at 339. In 1979, Angola utilized the protocol to convict a number of
mercenaries.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, § 1. ("The purpose of the United Nations are: To maintain international
peace, . . . to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of the threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace ....
)" Id. at 1(1).
Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1031, TS No.
993 (1945).
S. ROSENNE, DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 415 (2d ed. 1979). President
Truman, with the advice and consent of the Senate (Resolution of August 2, 1946) subject the United
States to compulsory jurisdiction before the International Court of Justice on any question of fact
which, if proven, would constitute a breach of international obligation. Truman reserved the right to
unilateral jurisdiction over matters essentially within the domestic jursdiction of the United States. Id.
at 415. See 61 Stat. (2)1218(1947), T.I.A.S. No 1598.
President Reagan invoked the reservation to deny the World Court jursidiction in Nicaragua's suit
concerning the CIA's mining of Nicaraguan ports. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1984 I.J.J. 4, reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 472-74.
See Comment, Application of El Salvador to Intervene in the Jurisdiction and Admissibility Phase of
Nicaragua v. United States, 78 AM. J. INT'L. L. 929 (1984) and, Hassan, A Legal Analysis of the
United States'Attempted Withdrawal From the Jurisdiction of the World Court in the Proceeding Initiated by Nicaragua, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 295 (1985).
See also Moynihan, International Law & International Order, 11 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & CoM. 1
(1984). Senator Moynihan, former U.S. Permanent Reprsentative to the United Nations, argues that
United States observence of international law "is a practical need... as much as domestic law is a
practical need. . . absent law, there would be no sanction for conduct that injures society." Id. at 8.
(emphasis in original).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 61 (1906) citing, United States v. Ajona, 120 U.S.
479 (1887). See also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); and Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 227
(1983). Failure to fulfill international obligations could seriously impair United States foreign policy
objectives. The Federal Government itself has acknowledged that the failure to enforce basic international law in domestic courts would not only be inappropriate, but also "might seriously damage the
credibility of our nation's commitment" to an international legal system. See Memorandum for the
United States as Amicus Curae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), reprinted in 19
I.L.M. 585, 604 (1980). (The Government specifically addressed the issue of human rights, but it
applies to international law generally.) See Paust, Book Review, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (1981).
Case Concerning The Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4. The
International Court of Justice found that every nation had obligations to the world community in
general, as opposed to those owed only to nations with which it had executed a treaty. Among these
obligations the court cited the prevention of outlawed acts of aggression, genocide and violations of
basic human rights. See Paust, supra note 47, at 225, and, The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, "No
principal of general law is more universally acknowledged than the perfect equality of nations." Id. at
122.
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it is at peace."0 Given the present international situation,5" this rule should apply
not only to the authorized acts of government personnel and their proxies, but
also to mercenaries. 52 A nation cannot avoid responsibility by hiding behind the
excuse that it does not have responsibity for the acts of private individuals. The
hostile acts of private individuals against a foreign state violate that nation's dignity as much as an invasion by official armed forces. 53 Current international law,
as represented by U.N. resolutions, and the United States own admissions, would
dictate that a member of the international community take the necessary domestic
steps to eradicate mercenaries.

Mercenaries, Foreign Policy and National Security
In addition to furthering the purposes of international law, the United States
could produce a more cohesive foreign policy by outlawing mercenary activity.54
The most important goal of a nation's foreign policy is to protect its national
50.
51.

52.

See Garcia-Mora, supra note 24, at 196 (quoting Judge Huber in Island of Palmas).
62 FOREIGN AFF. 777-804 (1983). During 1984, Foreign Affairs catalogued conflicts between Iran
and Iraq, Israeli troops and Moslems in Lebanon; Christian and Moslem factions in Lebanon, Russian
troops and Afghan rebels, guerillas in El Salvador and Nicarauga and the governments of those nations, and the U.S. and Grenada; terrorist attacks on U.S., French, Israeli, Phillippine, Peruvian,
South African and South Korean officials and troops; and civil strife in Northern Ireland, India, Bangladesh, the Phillipines, Cambodia, the Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe and Nigeria.
Two schools of thought exist on state responsibility for the hostile acts of private persons. One view
holds the state liable only if the injured party shows fault. A second view holds the state strictly liable
for the conduct of its citizens.
Hugo Grotius first articulated the theory of fault-based liability. "A civil community, just as any
other community, is not bound by the acts of the individual, apart from some act or neglect of its own
. . .,to participate in a crime a person must not only have knoweldge of it but also have the opportunity to prevent it." H. GROTIuS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIs LIBRI TRES bk II, ch XXI, § 2 (Kelsey
trans. 1925).
Grotius' theory of state liability continues to have force in modern international law. See, e.g., E.
BROCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD OR THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS (1915) and C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 310 (3d ed. 1948).

In contrast, Pufendorf presumes the existence of fault. "Now it is presumed unless its lack be
clearly established." S. PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTo bk. VIII, ch. VI,

§ 12 (W. Oldfather Trans. 1934).
Professor C.C. Hyde has carried Pufendorf's philosophy forward in international law. "[T]he society imposes upon each of its members.

. . certain duties to prevent the occurance of.

. .acts...

necessarily defiant of the principles of international law, or which may be productive of a
situation at variance with what these principles appear to demand .. " C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW CHIEFLY As INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 36 (2d ed. 1945). For a
complete discussion of the competing views of state liability and the hostile acts of private citizens, see
generally M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 16.
Under either interpretation the U.S. could potentially incure liability for the mercenary acts of its
citizens. Obviously, it would also incur liability under a system of implied state complicity because the
U.S. has the capacity to restrict mercenary activities.
[T]he Nation sovereign, must not allow its citizens to injure the subjects of another state, much
53.
less to offend that state itself. . . . Nations should mutually respect one another and avoid any
offense, injury or wrong. . . . If a sovereign who has power to see that his subjects act in a just
manner permits them to injure a foreign nation. . . he does no less a wrong than if he injured it
himself. Finally, the very safety of the state and of the society at large demands this care on the
part of every sovereign.
E. DE VATrEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, bk. II, ch. VI, 72 (Fenwick Trans. 1916).
The United States has adopted such a stance towards nations which condone or support the terrorist activities of their nationals. In particular, the United States had accused Nicaragua of exporting
revolution and aggression throughout Central America. During the debate on the CIA's mining of
Nicaraguan harbors, U.S. delegate to the U.N., Charles Lichenstein, stated: "[Since the Sandinista
takeover] coffee has given way as Nicaragua's principle export to so called indigenous revolutions and
to the systematic effort to destabilize free and democratic Governments throughout Central America."
Nicarauga'sComplaint of Aggression Discussed by Security Council, U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., March
that are.

. .

1984, at 7-8. The United States should at least be held to its own standards of nonintervention.

54.

C. FENWICK, supra note 17 at 3-4. The formulation of a consistent foreign policy has a close relation
to the purpose and enforcement of international law.
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security." Attaining this goal of national security is accomplished only by centralizing the mechanisms of foreign policy in one democratically responsive body.
The Constitution places exclusive control of foreign affairs in the Federal Government's hands. 56 Mercenaries take the execution of foreign policy and the protection of national security out of the Government's hands, hence the public's hands,
and places it with private individuals interested only in pecuniary or ideological
gain. Thus, the Government needs to take steps to restrict the free movement of
mercenaries, to prevent their activities from interfering with the execution of foreign policy and the protection of national interests.
Mercenaries operate outside the sphere of government control, yet their acts
reflect negatively on their nation. By allowing volunteers to engage in mercenary
activities, a nation implies that it condones their actions and that they represent
official policy. Moreover, since mercenary actions may draw a nation into a conflict it did not seek, 57 or one it unequivocally hoped to avoid, unauthorized
paramilitary activities threaten the safety and security of other Americans.5 8
Ironically, because mercenaries operate outside the sphere of official policy, an
administration seeking to influence foreign events could utilize mercenaries as
proxies for government troops. By using private armies, the government can covertly participate as a third party in foreign conflicts while maintaining an official
position of neutrality. In such a case the administration violates its fiduciary duty
to the electorate. The covert invasion of another country, either by official troops
or the use of mercenaries, undermines the democratic decision-making process.59
In a democractic society the nation should engage in war or armed conflict only
after public debate and discussion. The Constitution dictates that warfare be
public."
55. Id. at 1.
56. Note, Settlement of the Iranian Hostage Crisis: An Exercise of Constitutionaland Statutory Executive
Perogative in Foreign Affairs, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 993, 1003-1004 (1981). The Constitution
divides the conduct of foreign affairs between the Congress and the Executive. Congress retains power
over interstate commerce to "lay and collect... Duties, Imposts, and Excises...; define and punish
• . .felonies committed on the high Seas, and offenses against the law of Nations. . .; declare War
•.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
The president may exercise his power as "Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy... when
called into actual Service of the United States. . .make treaties (with the Advise and Consent of the
Senate) . . .[and] appoint Ambassadors." U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2. See also Zscherning v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429 (1968); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941); and, Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
The courts have recognized the President as the "sole organ" of American foreign policy. See, e.g.,

57.
58.

59.
60.

U.S. v. Hooker, 607 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 445 U.S. 905 (1980); Neil-Cooper Grain Co.
v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C.1974). See also H. KISSINGER, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
349 (3d ed. 1977).
42 CONG. Q., supra note 5 at 2445.
M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 16, at 9. The presence of mercenaries not only represents a violation of
international law, it also threatens national security. Thus, tolerating mercenaries violates the executive's fiduciary duty to the domestic population.
Lobel and Ratner, Is United States Military Intervention in CentralAmerica Illegal? HUM. RTS. Fall
1984 at 22.
Id. "[T]he Constitution, War Powers Act and Neutrality Act, are designed to ensure that the American people decide when to go to war with another country. . . disregarding these. . . provisions...
threatens the democratic decision-making process upon which our government ought to rest." Id. at

54.
See also THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 159 (A. Hamilton) (E. Meade ed. 1937). (Hamilton argued
that resting the power over military spending in Congress, to be exercised bi-annually, would grant the
people control of foreign relations, and protect them from an unfettered military). "As often as the
question comes forward, the public attention will be roused and attracted to the subject, by the party

in opposition ...
If such presumptions [that all elected officials would conspire to deprive the electorate of their
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The fear that the acts of an uncontrolled individual 6' would draw the United
States into conflict with one of the European powers led to the passage of the
initial neutrality laws. 62 Early American courts also recognized the potential
harm individuals, particularly mercenaries, could do to national security. For example, in 1866, the Circuit Court of New York, in explaining the purpose of the
neutrality laws, stated that a sovereign would lose its power to formulate foreign
policy if it allowed individuals to engage in hostilities against foreign nations.63
The court stated that the actions of a few could lessen a nation's control over
national security by embroiling an unwitting nation in an undesired confrontation. 6 With the increase in terrorism, civil wars, and wars of liberation,65 the
likelihood that individual acts could precipitate an international conflict is greater
today than it was in 1866. The penchant of Western mercenaries to attack leftist
states and Third World nations only intensifies tensions and increases the difficulty of conducting affairs with these nations.66
proper power over all affairs] can not fairly be made, there ought at once be an end of all delegated
authority." Id. at 163-64.
See also H. KISSINGER, supra note 56, at 205. "In a democracy, the conduct of foreign policy is
possible only with public support. Therefore.

61.

. . government owes . . . an articulation of the pur-

poses which its policies are designed to serve - to make clear our premises, to contribute to enlightened debate, and to explain how [these] policies serve the American peoples." Id.
THE FEDERALIST No. 3, 14 (J.Jay) (E. Earle ed. 1937). The framers of the Constitution recognized
the threat that individual actions posed to national security. Jay argued that the power over foreign
affairs should rest exclusively in the Federal Government because such an arrangement would provide
the greatest security for the people.
The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will always be found in
proportion to the number and weight of the causes, whether real or pretended, which provoke
or invite them. If this remark be just. . .(then fewer) . . . causes of war are likely to be given

62.

63.

64.
65.

66.

by UnitedAmerica as by disunited America. . .it will then follow that. . . the Union" could
better avoid conflict than the thirteen separate states.
Id. at 14. Or, presumably, isolated individuals pursuing their personal fortunes or ideologies.
Hamilton recognized that failure to centralize foreign relations in the Government endangered the
safety of the whole. "[Tlhe peace of the Whole ought not to be left at the disposal of a Part. The
Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members. And the
responsibility for an injury ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it." Id. at No.
80 (A. Hamilton) at 517 (emphasis in original).
See Lobel, The Rise and Decline of The NeutralityAct: Sovereignty and Congressional War Powers in
United States Foreign Policy, 24 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1, 15 (1983); Note, Nonenforcment of the Neutrality
Act: InternationalLaw and Foreign Policy Powers Under The Constitution, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1936,
1961 (1982).
Charge to Grand Jury - Neutrality Laws, 30 F. Cas. 1017 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 18,264)
The duty of a government to restrain its own citizens. . . from engaging in military expeditions against powers with which such government is at peace, arises out of the law of nations,
and its faithful observance is of the very highest importance to the peace of the world, the
stability and good order of society and the welfare of mankind. Were individuals . . .by
whatever motives. . . permitted, upon their own motion, to organize warlike enterprises...
and engage in excursions into the territory of. . .friendly nations, governments would no
longer have control of the momentous questions of war and peace.
Id. at 1018.
Id.
Treasury, Postal Service & General Government Appropriationfor Fiscal Year 1983, Before the Subcomm. on Treasury, PostalService & General Government Appropriations of the House Comm. on Appropriations,97th CONG., 2nd Sess. 1112-14 (1982) (Statement of John Simpson, Director, U.S. Secret
Service). Attacks against diplomats alone increased from 213 against diplomats of 31 nations in 1970
to 409 attacks against diplomats from 60 countries in 1980. Id. at 1114. The Secret Service has
reports of attacks by 103 separate terrorist organizations. Id. at 1119. See also supra at note 50.
M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 16, at 10. Western democracies have found it easy to ignore the illegality of mercenary attacks on states whose political or economic philosophies do not coincide with their
own. They have argued that international law does not require a democratic state to prevent its citizens from attacking a totalitarian or Marxist state. They argue that such a policy would violate the
national security interests of a democratic state. This justification, however, ignores the basic principles of international law which cross ideological borders. It also denies the reality that, in the contemporary world of global interdependence, Western nations must learn to deal with the Eastern bloc and
Third World nations on a level above warfare.
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Foreign sovereigns, particularly in the Third World, have become increasingly
suspicious of United States interference with their internal affairs. 67 Americans
cease to be welcome tourists or advisors and instead are the objects of scorn and
mistrust. Allowing Americans to participate in paramilitary operations only
serves to justify the suspicions of foreign sovereigns, endanger the safety of Americans abroad, and interfere in the formulation of foreign policy.
Both Democrat and Republican Presidents have justified military actions
under the guise of "coming to the rescue" of American citizens.68 For example,
the Reagan administration justified the invasion of Grenada as a rescue mission of
American medical students.6 9 The importance of the Grenada invasion lies in its
precedential value. Future Presidents seeking to strike a blow against perceived
threats from a foreign country, could utilize the "coming to the rescue" justification to invade a nation where the rescuees are not innocent students, but mercenaries. Such a scenario seems unlikely until one considers that a President
normally acquires popular and political support when defending Americans
abroad.70
67.

These supicions are not without justification. The Central Intelligence Agency and other government
agencies have attempted on numerous occasions, with varying degrees of success, to overthrow or
destabilize foreign governments. See, e.g., F. FITZGERALD, FIRE IN THE LAKE 96-184 (1972) (regarding the role of the CIA in the overthrow of South Vietnam's president Ngo Dinh Diem); P. WYDEN,
BAY OF PIGS: THE UNTOLD STORY (1979) (regarding the botched attempt to overthrow Castro in
Cuba). For Phillip Agee's accounts of the CIA's world-wide covert operations, see P. AGEE, INSIDE
THE COMPANY: CIA DIARY (1975); P. AGEE, DIRTY WORK: THE CIA INWESTERN EUROPE (cited
in Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 284 (1981)).
See also Rositzke, America's Secret Operations: A Perspective, 53 FOREIGN AFF. 334 (1975).
"Abroad, 'CIA' has become a symbol of American Imperialism, the protector of dictators, the enemy
of the left, the mastermind of coups and counter-coups in the developing world." Id.
68. Note, The War Powers Resolution: An Act Facing "Imminent Hostilities"A Decade Later, 16 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 915, 1044-45 (1983). The past three administrations, two Republican, one Democrat,
have each justified a military operation as a rescue mission. During the Ford Administration,
Cambodian communists atacked and captured the merchant vessel Mayaquez. President Ford ordered
the marines to retake the vessel to protect the lives and property of Americans. Id. at 968. With
regard to the Mayaquez incident see Paust, The Seizure and Recovery of the 'Mayaquez,' 85 YALE L. J.
774 (1976) and Friedlander, The 'Mayaquez' in Retrospect: HumanitarianIntervention or Showing the
Flag? 22 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 601 (1979) (arguing that the doctrine of self-help stands diametrically
opposed to the purposes of the United Nations charter). Id. at 602.
In 1980, President Carter first ordered, then aborted, a rescue operation to free the American
hostages held in Teheran, Iran. President Carter argued that he did not have to report the mission to
Congress because it was for humanitarian purposes and not a military action directed against Iran.
See Letter from President Carter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro-Tempore of the
Senate (Apr. 26, 1980), reprinted in Rescue Attempt for American Hostages in Iran, 1980-1981 Pub.
Papers 777, 777-779 (1981).
In 1983, President Reagan dispatched armed forces - along with troops from six Caribbean nations - on a "rescue mission" to the island of Grenada. The Reagan administration publicized the
invasion as a means of rescuing approximately 1,000 Americans, mostly medical students, on the
island. The administration sought to preempt any Cuban or Grenadian plans to seize the Americans
as hostages. Following the invasion, troops did find documents indicating plans to take U.S. citizens
hostage. See U.S. Reports Evidence of Island Hostage Plan, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at 10, col. 5.
Chronology, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 691 (1983). The invasion of Grenada began 25 October, 1983. The
U.S. argued that "an atmosphere of violent uncertainty" had engulfed the island since a coup wherein
a Marxist, pro-Cuban, government took control of the island. During the invasion, 18 Americans and
27 Cubans died. Id. at 691.
69. U.S. Military Actions in Grenada, Implications for US. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean. Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on InternationalSecurity and Scientific Affairs on Western Hemisphere Affairs of
the House Comm on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). (Compare views of Rep. Mervyn
Dymally (D-Cal.) ("The invasion represents a means of solving the [U.S.'s] problems in the region.")
and Rep. Robert Logomarsino (R. Cal.) ("The U.S. acted correctly and responsibly.") Id. at 2-4. The
invasion also presented the opportunity to eradicate what the administration perceived as "another
Cuba" in the Caribbean. Id. at 39.
For a general dicussion on the legality of the United States invasion of Grenada, see Symposium,
The United States Action in Grenada, 78 AM. J. INT'L. L. 131-175 (1984).
70. Regarding the Mayaquez incident, see Ford Is Backed, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1975, at 1, col. 7 (city
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Whether the executive carries out such a military action to rescue legitimately
endangered Americans, or to execute a punitive invasion of a nation, the possibility exists that the "free-lance". paramilitary activities of mercenaries could draw
the nation into an unwanted conflict.7 1 In either case, the private actions of the
mercenaries, rather than the democratic institutions intended by the Constitution,
would control the course of foreign policy. 72 Such a possibility poses a threat to
national security by increasing the likelihood of U.S. involvement in the internal
affairs of foreign nations and reduces the accountability of those bodies responsible for the conduct of foreign policy. 71
AMERICAN MERCENARIES AND DOMESTIC LAW
The United States does not have a comprehensive law prohibiting mercenary
activity by American citizens. While the United States does have laws which regulate mercenary activities within its borders,74 these laws have fallen into disuse
since the end of World War 11. 7 1 Moreover, none of these laws address the serious, and potentially more dangerous, problem of Americans serving as mercenaries abroad.
In 1794, Congress enacted the Neutrality Act which made it unlawful for an
American citizen to accept a commission with a foreign nation. 76 The Act had
three purposes: to incorporate international law into domestic law, to isolate the

71.
72.
73.

74.

75.

76.

ed.); On Grenada, see The View From a CapitolColored by Grenada ... N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1983, at
14, col. 3. Regarding political support, see, e.g., An ABC Call-In Poll Shows 90% Support Invasion of
Grenada N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1983, at 16, col. 6; GrenadaMove EarnsReagan Broad Political Gains,
Poll Shows, Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1983, at A3, col. 1.
42 CONG. Q, supra note 5, at 2445.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
United States-Angolan Relations, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Africa of the House Comm. on
InternationalRelations, 95th CONG. 2D SESS. 10 (1978) (Statement of John Stockwell, former Chief,
CIA Angola Task Force) ("Henry Kissinger and the CIA lied to the American people" about U.S.
involvement in Angola.) Despite Congressional restrictions, the CIA sent nearly $15 million to finance pro-Western forces in Angola. Approximately $300,000 of this supported the use of American
and Western European mercenaries. Id. at 10. See generally W. BURCHETr & D. ROEBUCK, supra
note 2, for a discussion of the CIA's role in Angola.
The U.S. also misled the international community on the status of American's fighting in Africa.
See 78 DEPT.OF STATE BULL. 714-15 (1975). Responding to allegations that there were U.S. citizens
fighting as mercenaries on behalf of the Rhodesian army, Congressman Donald M. Fraser, U.S.
Represenative to the U.N. General Assembly stated: "There are no U.S. military personnel in Rhodesia." Id. at 714.
These three laws are the Neutrality Act of 1794, 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 958 (1982)
(regarding Commissions to serve against friendly nations); and 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982) (regarding loss
of citizenship by entering into the armed forces of another sovereign). See also, 22 U.S.C. § 618(a)(2)
(1982) (regarding the registration of foreign agents operating in the United States). See Mercenariesin
Africa: Hearing Before the Special Subcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm. on International
Relations, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976) (Statement of Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General); and McDowell, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to InternationalLaw,
71 AM. J. INT'L. L 133, 141 (1977).
Lobel, supra note 62, at 37-44.
For a period of 130 years, between 1795 and 1925, there were thirty-four reported prosecutions, an average of one reported case every four years. Since 1925, there have been three
reported cases or an average of one every twenty years. Similarly, under § 959, a companion
to § 960, there were eleven reported prosecutions between 1794 and 1925, or one every twelve
years. Since 1925 there have been none.
Id. at 43-44.
Act of June 5, 1794. As currently codified the Act provides:
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides or prepares a
means for or furnishes the money for or takes part in any military or naval expedition or
enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or domination of any foreign
prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United States is at peace,
shall be fined not more than $3,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 960 (1982) (emphasis added).
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United States from foreign conflicts, and to outlaw private warfare so as

to

strengthen the Federal Government's control of foreign policy." By incorporating into the Act international law prohibiting interference in the internal affairs of
a foreign nation, Congress sought to facilitate enforcement of its duty to respect
the integrity of other nations." Courts have given the Neutrality Act a broad
interpretation and application.7 9 The courts have held that the Act prohibited the
training, 80 recruiting and enlisting of troops 8 ' and the contributing to or furnishing of the means of expediting a hostile expedition. 82 To violate the Act, the
individuals need not even execute their plans.83
Given the Neutrality Act's intended purposes and the broad interpretation
provided by the courts, the private acts of war carried out by American mercenaries clearly violate the Act. The Government should be able to prosecute and
convict American mercenaries. The law, however, contains a fatal flaw which
restricts its usefulness and allows mercenaries to easily avoid its prohibitions.
While courts have broadly construed the Act they have also emphasized the
jurisdictional requirement that some overt act must occur within the United
States.8 4 In Wiborg v. United States 5 the United States Supreme Court held that
Nonenforcement of the Neutrality Act supra note 62, at 1965. The Federal Government accepted responsibility for the acts of its citizens and thus felt constrained to restrict their movements. Further,
the Framers considered unauthorized hostile acts by private citizens as inconsistent with a civil society. Id. at 1965. The proponents felt that law would incorporate the nation's international duty of
neutrality into domestic law. Id. Supporters also felt it would isolate the United States from the
potentially destructive wars between the European powers. See Lobel, supra note 62, at 21. "Neutrality was a policy designed to enable a militarily weak and geographically isolated United States...
advance her commercial interest by avoiding. . . European wars." Id. at 21. Attorney General Randolph observed in 1795:
An infant country, deep in debt; necessitated to borrow in Europe; without manufacture;
without a land or naval force; without a competency of arms or ammunition. . . with a constitution no more than four years old; in a state of probation, and not exempt from foes-such a
country can have no greater curse in store for her than war.
Letter from Randolph to James Monroe (June 1, 1795), reprintedin 1 American State Papers: Foreign
Relations 706 (W. Lawrie and M. Clard ed.) The principal purpose of the Neutrality Act lay, however, in strengthening the authority of the central government over the citizen and placing the conduct
of warfare strictly with the state. Framers of the bill considered prevention of U.S. citizens from
conducting private warfare a quid pro quo to insure neutrality with foreign powers. Passage of the
Neutrality Act was designed to outlaw private warfare, thereby guaranteeing that Congress and the
President would formulate national policy, not private individuals, Lobel supra note 62 at 25.
When Congress revised the Act in 1817, it reiterated the Act's original purpose. Id. at 25, n.136.
78. Nonenforcement of the Neutrality Laws, supra note 61, at 1955.
79. The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat) 283 (1822), (the Act affords protection against attack to
all nations with which the United States is at peace, whether or not the United States had accorded it
diplomatic recognition); Charge to Grand Jury - Neutrality Laws, 30 F. Cas. 1017 (C.C.N.D.N.Y.
1866) (No. 18, 264) (the law applies to both American citizens and foreign nationals organizing hostile
expeditions within the United States); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 201, 202 (C.C.D. Va. 1807)
(No. 14,694a); see also, The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 56 (1897); Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S.
632, 647 (1896); De Orozco v. United States, 237 F. 1009, 1012 (5th Cir. 1916).
The Supreme Court has not limited the Act to large expeditions but has concentrated on the
"military character" of the act intended. Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. at 651; United States v.
Sander, 241 F. 417, 419-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
80. United States v. Hughes, 70 F. 976 (E.D.S.C. 1895).
81. United States v. Lumsden, 26 F. Cas. 1013, 1015 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1856) (No. 13,641); United States v.
Sullivan, 27 F. Cas. 367,377 (S.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 15,974).
82. Charge to Grand Jury - Neutrality Laws, 30 F. Cas. 1021, 1022 (C.C.D. Ohio 1851) (No. 18,267)
(Money, Clothing and arms); United States v. Murphy, 84 F. 609 (D. Del. 1818) (transportation).
83. United States v. Ybanez, 53 F. 536, (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1892) "The . . . statute is very comprehensive
" Id. at 538.
and peremptory . . . it does not wait for the project to be consummated ....
84. With regard to § 958, See Charge to Grand Jury, Neutrality Laws, 30 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C. Ohio 1838)
(No. 18,265) "[E]very violation of this law must have been committed within this state; and by a
citizen of the United States." Id. at 1019. Regarding § 959, see United States v. O'Brien, 75 F. 900
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896). "[P]ersons desiring to enlist in foreign military service may lawfully go abroad
for this purpose in any way they see fit. . . either separately or in association. . . Provided they do
77.
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the Act did not prohibit an individual or group from voluntarily going abroad to
enlist in a foreign military service or from conducting private acts of hostility
against a foreign state. 86 The Court stated that the law only proscribed acts occurring within the United States which contribute toward such hostile acts against
foreign states.8 7

Numerous administrations have utilized this interpretation of the Neutrality
Act to avoid bringing prosecutions against pro-Western mercenaries.88 This interpretation effectively negates the Act's purpose of centralizing foreign policy and
protecting American neutrality. Given this jurisdictional loophole, American citizens may pursue their ideological and economic forays against foreign states by
simply stepping beyond the borders of the United States before declaring their
purpose. This loophole renders the Neutrality Act an empty shell in need of
revision.
MERCENARIES AND THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
The Constitution does not explicitly protect the right to travel.8 9 Over time,
however, Americans have come to expect the right to travel free of government
not form or set on foot any military expedition or enterprise..." within the territory of the United
States. Id. at 907. See also Burmester supra note 22 at 52; and Note supra note 6, at 595-99.
85. 163 U.S. 632 (1896). In Wiborg, a sea captain and his crew transported armed insurgents from New
Jersey to Cuba to assist in the war between Spain and Cuba. The Court upheld the conviction of the
sea captain, but found his crew innocent of violating the neutrality laws. The Court differentiated
between them on the grounds that the captain knew of the violation while still within United States
territory, while the crew only became aware of the ship's destination after entering international
waters.
86. See Cesner, supranote 4, at 356. The court enforced this holding in Gayon v. McCarthy, 252 U.S. 171
(1920); and The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1 (1897), where they found acts which occurred within the
U.S. sufficient to justify prosecution.
87. 163 U.S. at 653. See also Gayon v. McCarthy, 252 U.S. 171, 176 (1920).
88. The Kennedy, Carter and Reagan administrations have all invoked this interpretation of the Neutrality Act when questioned on the presence of U.S. mercenaries in foreign lands, 42 CONG. Q. 2230
(1984). "Recent administrations have read [the provisions of § 960] very narrowly: . . . the law did
not bar military operations by U.S. citizens against a foreign country so long as they are launched
from non-U.S. territory.'" Id. at 2230.
Shortly before U.S.-backed mercenaries and exiles invaded Cuba, Attorney General Robert Kennedy attacked the neutrality laws as "among the oldest laws in our statute books .... Clearly...
not designed for the kind of situation which exists in the world today." Id.
The Reagan administration has gone one step further and completely ignored the antifunding
clause of § 960. The State Department announced on September 10, 1984, that it would not discourage the raising of funds to support the anti-Sandinista guerillas. The State Department stated: "[ilt is
our understanding that such contributions can be perfectly legal." Id. at 2230. Such funding is legal
only if not used in organizing, outfitting, or supporting armed aggression against any foreign country
or its commerce. See Bailey v. O'Mahoney, 10 Abb. Pr. N.S. 270 (1871).
The neutrality laws have never significantly controlled mercenaries' activities. Yet, the Reagan
administration has downgraded the laws to little more than a bargaining chip. See Sigmund, supra
note 13, at 639. For example, Cuban and Nicaraguan exiles conducted paramilitary training in California and Florida. The Reagan administration refused to prosecute the groups on the grounds that
they had not hurt anyone and had not formulated specific plans to invade their homelands. Note,
supra note 62, at 1955. When Secretary of State Haig began negotiations with the Sandinistas, one
American proposal included enforcement of United States domestic laws to protect Nicaragua from
attack by the exiles. Id. at 1955. See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1982, at Al, col. 6; Id. Apr. 15, 1982,
at A2, col. 5.
The Reagan Administration contends its support for the Contras represents either actions taken in
self-defense against the aggression of Cuba and Nicaragua against El Salvador, or simply represents
aid to one side in a civil war. See Lobel and Ratner, supra note 62, at 22. See also Dellums v. Smith,
577 F. Supp. 1449 (N.D. Ca. 1984). (The court in Dellums upheld a private citizen's mandamus
action compelling the Attorney General to investigate whether or not the President had violated the
Neutrality Act by supporting armed insurgence against Nicaragua, and held that the Neutrality Act
applied to the President).
89. Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787 162 (1956). "Nothing in the
Constitution expressly protects freedom of movement." Id. at 162.

1985]

Regulation of Mercernaries

restrictions. 90 The Supreme Court has recognized the right to unfettered interstate travel. 91 Although the courts initially viewed the right to travel abroad as
93
equivalent to interstate travel, 92 the Supreme Court has distinguished the two.
The Court has found less constitutional protection for the right to travel internationally.94 The Court has also held that the Executive has the authority to restrict
international travel when the individual's purpose for traveling abroad conflicts
with national security. 9 5 Mercenary activities of American citizens clearly fall
within the category of conduct which conflicts with national security.
The privilege to travel abroad has become inexorably linked to the possession
97
of a passport. '9 The President, through the Secretary of State, has the authority
90.

Note, The Right to Travel and PassportRevocation: Haig v. Agee, BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 391 (1982).
Common law nations have long sought to control ingress and egress from their borders. Id. at 396.
For a history of the battle between the early monarchy and the Catholic Church over the right to
travel, see Note, Passportand Freedom of Travel: The Conflict of a Right and a Privilege, 41 GEO. L.J.,
63, 65 (1952). For a natural law perspective on the right to travel see Fahy, The Right to Travel, 6
NAT. L. F. 109 (1961). English barons secured the right to travel freely in section 42 of the Magna
Carta. See Lansing, Freedom of Travel. Is the Issuance of a Passportan IndividualRight or a Governmental Perogative, 11 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 15, 16 (1981). The Magna Carta abolished the writ of
Ne Exeat Regmo, by which the British Crown regulated travel by requiring a traveler to obtain royal
permission before leaving the country. Id. at 16. In the New World the English settlers incorporated
freedom of movement into their charters. See, e.g., Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641, 117,
"Every man of or within this jurisdiciton shall have free libertie, not with standing any Civill power, to
remove both himselfe and his familie at their pleasure out of the same, provided there be no legall
impediment to the contrarie." Lansing, supra at 398.
The Framers of the Constitution cited King George III's attempts to restrict immigration to the
colonies in the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration of Independence, 2 (U.S. 1776). The
Articles of Confederation explicitly recognized a right of unfettered travel:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the peoples of the
different states in this union, the free inhibitants of these states shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the people of each state shall
have free ingress and regress to and from any other state ....
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV. At the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, however, the drafters of the Constitution did not incorporate article IV into the Constitution. Chaffe, supra note 88, at
185. See Fahy, supra (The natural rights of man included the right of interstate and international
travel and represented an unchallenged right in Colonial America). Id. at 109-10.
The right to travel received support in the fourteenth amendment. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States,"
U.S. CONST. art. 14. See also Note, The Right to Travel and the Loyalty Oath: Woodward v. Rogers
(D.D.C. 1972), 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L 387, 391 (1973).

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Problem, 35 FOREIGN AFF. 17 (1956) 96.

97.

The U.S. Supreme Court early on

recognized a right of interstate travel. In Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1869), the Court
struck down a Nevada tax of one dollar assessed against each person leaving the state. The Court
declared that each citizen had "the right to come to the seat of the government..." and ". . . has a
right to free access to its (the nation's) sea-ports. . . and the right is. . . independent of the will of
any State over which soil he must pass in the exercise of it." Id. at 44. The Court did not rest its
decision on the commerce clause, but instead read into the Constitution a right of undisturbed travel
to the nation's capital. Chaffe, supra note 89, at 189. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have affirmed the right of interstate travel, relying on either the commerce clause, see, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, Williams v. Rears,
179 U.S. 270 (1900); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 579 (1896); or the fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunties clause, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968); United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,177 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Crandal v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1896). See also Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941),
in which the Court struck down a state law making it a crime for a resident to bring indigent nonresidents into the state.
Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952). "[I]t is difficult to see where in principle, freedom
to travel outside the United States is any less an attribute of personal liberty [than interstate travel]."
Id. at 451. See also Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978).
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1965).
Haig v. Agee, 435 U.S. 280 (1981).
U.S. law requires the possession of a passport to leave or enter the United States. See Travel Control
of Citizens and Aliens, 22 U.S.C. § 1185 (1982). See also Jaffe, The Right to Travel: The Passport
See 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1982) and, 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982).

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 12:175

to deny an application for a passport 98 or to revoke a passport.9 9 Citizens have,
however, successfully challenged the President's authority when denied passports
on political grounds."°° The Supreme Court has held that revoking a passport as
a means of silencing free speech violates the first amendment.1 t 1 The Supreme
Court has also limited the Executive's discretion by holding that while the right
to travel is not protected by the first amendment, it is protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment.102 The Court has, however, consistently upheld the President's right to restrict travel in the interest of national security. 03
With the power to revoke the passports of those whose conduct interferes with
national security, the Executive could curtail the mercenary acitivities of American citizens. The problem remains, however, of creating a law which the President will consistently enforce. Congress could insure enforcement of the
Neutrality Act by revising both the neutrality laws and the laws governing the
mechanism by which Americans travel abroad, the passport."M The first step of
the two step revision would result in making mercenary activities engaged in
outside the borders of the United States a clear violation of the Neutrality Act.
The revised structure of the Passport Act would require the President to revoke
the passports of persons violating the Neutrality Act. The revised passport laws
become, in essence, the tool necessary to enforce the Neutrality Act.
In a recent decision, Haig v. Agee"°5 the Supreme Court provides the constitutional basis for such a revision. In Agee, the Supreme Court upheld the revocation
of an American citizen's passport whose conduct was "likely to cause serious
damage to national security or foreign policy of the United States."
Between 1974 and 1980, a former CIA agent, Philip Agee traveled to numer06
ous nations and publicly exposed CIA agents operating in those nations.'
Agee's activities led to incidents of violence against individuals associated with
98.
99.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

105.

106.

Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561 (1957).
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). The President has the authority to revoke passports when the
holder's activities cause or are likely to cause serious damage to national security or foreign policy. Id.
at 301. See J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST (1906). The President and Secretary of State
have held the express power to revoke or deny passports since 1856. Passport Act of 1856 § 23, 11
Stat. 60 (1856). The Secretary would not grant passports to anyone violating the laws of the United
States, Moore, supra, at 960.
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 116 (1958).
378 U.S. at 500; 357 U.S. at 116.
Regan v. Wald, 52 U.S.L.W. 4966, 4971 (1984); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1(1965). See also Harisiades
v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 91952).
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
The Supreme Court first defined the legal effect of a passport in Urtetiqui v. D'Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.)
692 (1835):
There is no law of the United States in any manner regulating the issuing of passports, or
directing upon what evidence it may be done, or declaring their legal effect . . . . It is a
document which, from its nature and object, is addressed to foreign powers; purporting only to
be a request that the bearer of it may pass safely and freely; and it is to be considered rather in
the character of a political document, by which the bearer is recognized in foreign countries as
an American citizen; and which, by usage and the law of nations, is received as evidence of the
fact.
Id. at 698.
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). From 1957 to 1968 the CIA employed Agee as an agent gathering
covert intelligence in foreign nations. Agee left the agency in 1968 and in 1974 began a campaign to
expose CIA operatives and to abolish the CIA. Id. at 287.
Id. at 284. Between 1974 and 1978 Agee published two books identifying hundreds of CIA employees.
See P. AGEE, INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA DIARY (1975); DIRTY WORK, THE CIA IN WESTERN
EUROPE (P. Agee & L. Wolf, eds. 1978). In the latter and a subsequent work, Agee compiled and
published "Who's Where" lists of alleged CIA personnel and "Who's Who" biographies of these employees. See also P. Agee, Introduction, in DIRTY WORK 2: THE CIA IN AFRICA (E. Ray, W.
Schapp, K. Van Meter, & L. Wolf. eds. 1979). Cited at 453 U.S. at 284, n. 3.
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the CIA. 10 7 In 1979, the Secretary of State notified Agee, then living in West
Germany, that his passport had been revoked.10 8 Agee sued,1 9 alleging that the
revocation violated his fifth amendment right to travel and first amendment right
to free speech.1 10 The district court found the regulation invalid and restored
Agee's passport. The court of appeals affirmed.' 11 The United States Supreme

Court reversed.1 2
The Court found that the Secretary of State had broad powers to revoke passports 1 3 based in the wide scope given the Executive regarding national security
and foreign policy. 4 The Court found that Congress intended the Executive, in
executing foreign policy, to "curtail or prevent international travel by American
citizens if it was contrary to the national security." '15
The Court dismissed Agee's constitutional objections, holding that the interest
of national security outweighed Agee's conditional right to travel. Regarding
Agee's first amendment claim, the Court found the revocation rested on Agee's
conduct, not his political beliefs.11 6 The Court concluded that the Executive may
revoke a passport to restrict the action of an American citizen where a substantial
likelihood exits that such action will seriously damage national security or foreign
policy. 117 Due process requires no more than a statement of reasons and a
prompt post revocation hearing.11 8
The dissent in Agee argued that the majority's opinion gave the President far
greater power to revoke a passport than Congress intended. 19 Justice Brennan

107. Id. at 285. The Government in its brief did not accuse Agee of inciting violence. Acts of violence did,
however, closely follow the exposure of CIA personnel. In Greece, in December of 1975, Richard
Welsh was murdered after being identified as a CIA Chief of Station by an Athens newspaper. In
1981, two members of the American Institute for Free Labor Development in El Salvador were assassinated after Agee identified the Institute as a front for the CIA. Id. at 285, n.7.
108. 453 U.S. at 286. The notice informed Agee of the reason for the revocation-his campaign against the
CIA-and advised Agee of his right to an administrative hearing. The Secretary based his authority
on 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1980): "A passport may be refused in any case in which:
(4) The Secretary determines that the national's activities abroad are causing or are likely to cause
serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United States."
109. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1980).
110. 483 F. Supp. at 732.
111. Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
112. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. at 310.
113. The Court found the Secretary's power in the Passport Act, 22 U.S.C. § 211 (1982), which states:
The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports, and cause passports to be granted,
issued, and verified in foreign countries by diplomatic representatives. . . under such rules as
the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States, and no other
person shall grant, issue, or verify such passports. Unless authorized by law, a passport may
not be designated as restricted for travel to or for use in any country other than a country with
which the United States is at war, where armed hostilities are in progress, or where there is
imminent danger to the public health or the physical safety of United States travellers.
Id. at § 211 (a).
114. 453 U.S. at 291-92. The Court stated that "Congress-in giving the Executive authority over matters of
foreign affairs - must of necessity paint with a brush broader than it customarily wields in domestic
areas, [Zemel v. Rusk) 381 U.S. at 17." (emphasis in original) Id. at 292.
115. 453 U.S. at 297. The Court stated that unless the Secretary could revoke passports on national security grounds, the intent of Congress in enacting Travel Control Act of May 22, 1918, ch 81 §§ 1-2, 40
Stat 559, would not be fulfilled. The language of the Travel Control Act was identical in pertinent part
to the Passport Act of 1926.
116. 453 U.S. at 306.
117. Id. at 307.
118. Id. at 310. On Haig v. Agee see Note, The Right to Travel and PassportRevocation: Haig v. Agee, 8
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 391 (1982); Note, The Power of the Executive to Restrict the International
Travel of American Citizens on National Security and Foreign Policy Grounds, 30 BUFFALO L. REV.
781, 799 (1981); LANSING, Freedom to Travel: Is the Issuance of a Passportan Individual Right or A
Government Perogrative? 11 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 15 (1981).
119. 453 U.S. 280, 310 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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stated that Congress must "expressly delegate authority to the secretary to deny
or revoke passports for foreign policy or national security reasons before he may
the Court failed to construct the necessary
exercise such authority." 2 o Further,
12 1
guidelines to revoke passports.
REVISING THE NEUTRALITY AND PASSPORT ACTS TO RESTRICT
MERCENARIES.
The Court's interpretation of the Passport Act of 1926 in Agee provides the
President with the power necessary to curtail the mercenary activities of American citizens. The problem of presidential inaction and nonenforcement of the
neutrality laws, however, remains. Any new law to eradicate mercenaries must
solve this problem. It must also incorporate the central purposes of the Neutrality
Act - Federal control of foreign policy and incorporation of international law
into domestic law. It must also facilitate continuation of a responsive, democratic
process of decision making in foreign affairs. Finally, any new law should conform with not only the due process requirements established by the majority 1 in
22
Agee, but also, to avoid abuse, the consitutional issues raised in the dissent.
Congress could accomplish this goal by revising both the Neutrality Act and the

Passport Act to form an effective, two-step weapon against mercenaries.
Revising the Neutrality Act
The Neutrality Act would be revised in following ways.'

23

The most impor-

120. 453 U.S. at 312 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Relying on Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) and Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), Justice Brennan found the right to travel came under the umbrella of
personal liberties protected by the fifth amendment. As such, any infringement could only occur
"pursuant to the law-making function of the Congress" Id. at 312. Justice Brennan stated that the
Passport Act of 1926 did not expressly authorize the revocation of Passports on national security
grounds. Id. at 313. Failing to find sufficient administrative practice, Justice Brennan argued that
is not sufficient." Id. at 314
Kent unequivocally held that "mere construction by the Executive ...
(emphasis in original).
121. 453 U.S. at 318 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Note, The Right to Travel, supra note 118, at 526. (As
now construed the Secretary's potential reach is very broad. During oral argument, Solicitor General
Wade H. McCree stated that the Secretary of State could utilize his revocation authority to deny a
passport to a person wishing to go to El Salvador to denounce the United States' policy in that country. Justice Brennan interpreted the opinion as sanctioning the revocation of not only the passport of
the Philip Agees of the world, but also any individual who disagrees with government policy and
expresses their views. 453 U.S. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
122. Supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
123. Currently the Neutrality Act 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1982) states:
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides or prepares a
means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in any military or naval expedition or
enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominion of any foreign prince
or state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United States is at peace, shall be
fined no more than $3,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both (emphasis added).
A revised Neutrality Act would state:
(a) any person, or enterprise, who knowingly begins or recruits or sets on foot or provides
or prepares a means for or furnishes money, arms, equipment or military materials for, or takes
part in or organizes or supervises, any military or naval expedition or mission to be carried out
against or within the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony,
district, or people with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined $10,000 or imprisoned
for five years, or both and shall be subject to the provisions of [revised] title 22, United States
Code, Section 21 l(a).
(b)
It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate the provisions of subsection
(a) of this section.
(c)
As used in this section(1) "person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial
interest in property, and includes, but is not limited to, United States citizens,
(2) "enterprise" includes, but is not limited to, any individual, association, or other
legal entity, any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.
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tant revision would be the elimination of the jurisdictional loophole which now
exists. Congress could accomplish this by simply removing the language limiting
the application of the Act to mercenary missions begun "within the United
States." This would allow the President to bring actions against mercenaries regardless of the point of origin of their operations. The revised law would also
expand the potential defendants by expressly defining the terms "person" and "enterprise" and by including a conspiracy provision.' 24 By broadly defining person
and enterprise and including a conspiracy provision the revised Neutrality Act
provides the necessary tools to reach not only the actual soldier of fortune, but
also the source of funding and organization behind the mercenary operations.
The revised Neutrality Act would also dictate that the President enforce the
act against mercenaries regardless of the status of relations between the United
States and the aggrieved nation. The definition of state provided in the revised act
does not differentiate between a government which the United States recognizes
and one which it does not. The revised Act eliminates discretionary sentencing
and requires that mercenaries convicted under the Act receive a fine of $10,000 or
a prison term of five years. Finally, and most importantly, in conjunction with the
revised passport laws, the act requires the Executive to revoke the passport of any
person violating the neutrality laws of the United States.
Revising the PassportAct of 1926
The one problem not rectified in the revised Neutrality Act is consistent enforcement by the Executive. Congress should require the Secretary of State to
revoke the passport of any American violating the provisions of the revised Neutrality Act. Congress could effectuate this by amending the Passport Act to require the President to revoke the passport of any citizen violating the neutrality
laws. 125 Granting the Executive the power to revoke passports strengthens the
Neutrality Act and fulfills its intended purpose.
Mandatory revocation serves other purposes as well. Failure of the President
to enforce the Neutrality Act implies official support of the mercenary activities.
Congress may then take appropriate steps under the War Powers Act.12 6 It also
pushes support for mercenaries by the United States into the public forum where
the President must justify his actions before the people and their representatives.
In both cases, the two-step revision contributes to the democratization of foreign
policy. If the President does invoke the revised laws this sends a clear message to
the foreign nations involved that the United States does not support the merce(3)

"states" includes any foreign sovereign whether or not recognized by the United

States for diplomatic purposes.
(d)

The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its intended

purposes.
124. The language of these provisions is based on similar language in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1962(d) (1982).
125. A revision of the Passport Act would appear as:
§ 21 l(a). Authority to grant, issue, and verify passports;
The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports, and cause passports to be granted,
issued, and verified in foreign countries by diplomatic representives. . . under such rules as the
President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States, and no other
person shall grant, issue, or verify such passports. Unless authorized by law, a passport may
not be designated as restricted for travel to or for use in any country other than a country with
which the United States is at war, where armed hostilities are in progress, or where there is
imminent danger to the public health or the physical safety of United States travellers.
§ 211 (b). The President or the Secretary of State, shall revoke the passport of any citizen who
violates the provisions of the Neutrality laws of the United States (18 U.S.C. § 960). Nothing
in subsection (a) of this chapter will operate to restrict the execution of this subsection.
126. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1982).
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naries. Thus the two-step revision brings domestic law into line with customary
international law favoring the outlawing of mercenaries. 27 The revised laws allow the United States to fulfill its international duty to respect the integrity of
other sovereign states
and to take all necessary steps to abide by the goals of the
28
United Nations.
The two-step revision also addresses the constitutional objections raised by the
dissent in Agee. 12 9 It constructs adequate guidelines for the revocation of passports. The revised Act would remove the discretionary aspect of revocation.
With a clear, albeit broad, definition of a mercenary and no jurisdictional limitation on the Neutrality Act, the Secretary of State must act when it becomes apparent that Americans have breached the nation's neutrality.
CONCLUSION
Under customary international law a sovereign had no responsibility for the
mercenary acts of its nationals. International law distinguished between private
and state behavior and did not require nations to actively protect the integrity of
other nations. This laissiz-faire perception of state responsibility changed following World War II. Since the end of that war, the world community has come to
realize the threat mercenaries pose to international peace and security. Modern
international law calls for each nation to take all necesary steps to restrict the
recruitment, training and transit of mercenaries.
Current United States law on mercenaries, however, still conforms with nineteenth century international law. The United States has a responsibility to the
world community to revise its law to restrict American mercenaries. It can accomplish this by refining and clarifying the Neutrality Act. Specifically, the
United States could withdraw current jurisdictional restrictions thus allowing the
prosecution of American mercenaries regardless of where they begin their mercenary activities.
This revision alone, however, does little to fulfill either the purposes behind
the Neutrality Act or our international responsibilities. Without a mechanism to
enforce the Act, the neutrality laws become little more than an instrument of
foreign policy, rather than a strict guide. Congress could provide this mechanism
by making a violation of the neutrality laws per se grounds for revocation of a
citizen's passport. Revising the Passport Act would make a violation of the Neutrality Act a predicate offense requiring the Secretary of State to revoke the mercenaries' passports. Such a revision would strengthen the neutrality laws and force
the President to take action when he became aware of the presence of American
mercenaries or mercenaries funded by Americans in foreign lands. Thus, the
President would be forced to prosecute the violators or acknowledge that they
represent American foreign policy.
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